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Daniel Mwale v Njolomole Mtonga and Another Appeal No.004 (2019) 
Dunia P. Zongwe1 
This is a classic case of sour grapes. After failing to secure a favourable decision from the 
judges, the losing party accused them of prejudice. This happened in the Mwale v Mtonga 
matter, decided by the Supreme Court of Zambia in 20192. When his appeal failed, Daniel 
Mwale reacted by accusing that court and the entire judiciary of corruption. 
 
Though this sort of reaction lacks grace, most people can expect the losing side to sling mud at 
the court. What people can hardly predict, however, is what the court will do when a losing 
litigant melts down in this manner. The court faces at least five choices: (1) The court could 
completely ignore the loser’s rantings; (2) it could discharge them but warn against such 
outbursts; (3) it could convict them of contempt but without imposing any effective sentence; 
(4) it could convict them of contempt and mete out a sentence often dished out by judges in 
cases of contempt; or (5) it could convict them and impose a harsh sentence to make an example 
of them. 
 
The question is: What would a Solomon-like judge do in this case? Almost certainly, they 
would think twice before stepping on and crushing sour grapes that they find on the floor, 
crying for mercy. 
 
The facts 
The certificate of title relating to a farm located in Lusaka described Mwale and Njolomole 
Mtonga as co-tenants of the farm. In January 2007, Mwale applied to the High Court for two 
orders: an order declaring Mwale the sole owner of the farm and another order directing the 
Chief Registrar of Lands and Deeds to cancel the certificate and replace it with a new one. 
The defendant, Mtonga, objected to Mwale’s application by arguing that, because the title in 
question was issued in 1991, the Limitation Act 1939 (UK) prevented him from recovering 
land. Indeed, section 4(3) of that Act bars anyone from recovering land after 12 years have 
elapsed. The High Court accepted Mtonga’s preliminary objection and rejected Mwale’s 
application. 
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Mwale then appealed to the Supreme Court of Zambia. But on 19 August 2015 the court sided 
with the High Court and dismissed Mwale’s appeal.3 At that moment, Mwale lost his 
composure. According to Malila JS, the Supreme Court’s appeal judgment so annoyed Mwale 
that he “went into a frenzy” and denigrated the Supreme Court judges and the whole judiciary.4 
On 26 October 2017, he wrote the letter that got him in trouble with the Zambian Supreme 
Court – a letter that he addressed to the Deputy Chief Justice M.S. Mwanamwambwa and 
copied to several high-ranking state officials, including the Chief Justice, the Minister of 
Justice, the Minister of National Guidance and Religious Affairs, and the Director of the Anti-
Corruption Commission. 
 
In that letter, Mwale accused the Supreme Court of turning a blind eye to the “obvious fact” 
that corrupt practices prevent ordinary poor Zambians from getting title to their property 
because the Court was determined to apply the British Limitation Act. In doing so, the Supreme 
Court sought – still according to Mwale – to appease “corrupt civil servants at the Ministry of 
Lands and the white collar criminals that work in league with senior officers.” 
 
Significance of the Judgment 
The Supreme Court could have ignored what Mwale described himself as “the rantings of a 
confused man” “in a state of emotional trauma” after he lost the farm.5 Surely, judges have the 
right to protect the reputation of the courts, and a judge may thus try and punish a person for 
vilifying the courts. As Malila J reminded, scandalizing the court constitutes a sui generis (i.e., 
unique) offence and does not form part of the ordinary criminal law.6 
 
The offence of scandalizing the court falls under the general crime of ‘contempt of court’, 
which comprises several types of conduct that intentionally and unlawfully violates the dignity, 
repute or authority of a judge or a judicial body.7 Snyman defines “scandalizing the court” as 
consisting in publishing, in writing or verbally, allegations which, objectively, tend to bring 
judges, magistrates or the administration of justice through the courts generally into contempt, 
                                                             
3 Daniel Mwale v Njolomole Mtonga (Selected Judgement No 25 of 2015). 
4 Daniel Mwale v Njolomole Mtonga [2019] Supreme Court of Zambia J3. 
5 ibid J9-10. 
6 ibid J15. 
7 CR Snyman Criminal Law (6th edn, LexisNexis 2014) 315-317 and 322-324. 




or unjustly to cast suspicion on the administration of justice.8 As Malila held, the offence of 
scandalizing the court permissibly derogates from freedom of expression guaranteed under the 
Zambian Constitution.9 Article 20(3)(b) of the Constitution allows laws that derogate from 
freedom of expression when such laws become necessary to maintain the authority and 
independence of the courts. 
 
Malila quoted Savenda10 to affirm that the offence exists to protect the administration of justice: 
We stated in [Savenda] that one of the factors which eat at the public confidence in the 
Judiciary as an important estate of government is the frequent and often unjustified 
assault on the integrity of the institution or its members.11 
 
Through his letter, Mwale impugned the integrity of the courts in Zambia, and that itself would 
entitle the Supreme Court to try him for scandalizing the court. But does that mean that the 
court ought to exercise its right to protect the integrity of the judicial office? 
The Supreme Court concluded that Mwale’s letter had the effect of scandalizing the court and 
undermining the administration of justice.12 It then reacted to the letter in two stages. Initially, 
on 12 December 2017, Mwanamwambwa DCJ replied to Mwale’s letter to explain the 
procedure in the Supreme Court and how that court reaches its decisions. In particular, the 
learned judge explained the court’s decision to uphold the High Court judgment that rejected 
Mwale’s application. Even so, Mwanamwambwa’s reply did not seem to move Mwale. On the 
contrary, Mwale wrote a second letter. 
 
Although Malila J’s majority judgment does not say what Mwale’s second letter actually 
contained, the Supreme Court ordered Mwale to appear before it and present arguments why 
the Court should not cite him for contempt of court. Eventually, in 2019, the Supreme Court 
convicted Mwale of contempt of court and sentenced him to pay a fine of K20,000 within seven 
days, failing which he would spend nine months in prison. 
A lawyer who looks closely at this matter can easily take issue with the manner in which the 
Supreme Court treated Mwale. While most lawyers would agree with the Supreme Court’s 
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decision to uphold the High Court’s ruling, they would balk at the proposition that the Supreme 
Court should have cited Mwale for or convicted him of contempt. Mwanamwambwa’s 
initiative to reply to Mwale’s letter and use this opportunity to educate the old man on the ways 
of the Supreme Court was very wise. Nevertheless did the Court really need to proceed against 
Mwale after he disregarded Mwanamwambwa’s reply and sent the second letter? 
 
Granted, the summons issued to Mwale prompted him to write a letter of apology. In that letter, 
written on 18 September 2018, Mwale “unreservedly” apologized to Mwanamwambwa for the 
first letter that he wrote and that scandalized the court. Given that Mwale withdrew the 
contemptuous statements by addressing his apology letter to Mwanamwambwa and all the 
high-ranking state officials to which he had copied the first letter, could the judges in that case 
still argue that the Supreme Court and the judiciary suffered prejudice? 
 
Even assuming that the Court suffered reputational harm and that it should thus act against him, 
Mwale readily admitted to the charge. The Court claimed that it considered Mwale’s ready 
admission to the charge,13 but failed to follow up on what this consideration implies. 
Specifically, the lawyer representing Mwale cited the case of Banda v Mumba,14 in which the 
Supreme Court of Zambia discharged the contemnor15 after he admitted the charge and 
withdrew the contemptuous material. The court brushed aside the Banda case merely by 
observing that Banda cannot be equated to Mwale’s contempt matter.16 It did not give any facts 
that distinguish the two matters. Yet the defence lawyer characterized the two cases as closely 
similar, “slightly different”.17 
 
In fact, the court missed the gist of the defence counsel’s argument: if the Supreme Court 
discharged the contemnor in a case where he published the contemptuous material in the media 
(a more serious circumstance), then surely the self-same court should treat Mwale more 
leniently as he addressed the contemptuous material to a few individuals only. If the court had 
fully considered the admission charge and the Banda case, it would have provided facts to 
distinguish the Banda and the present case, and it would have explained why Banda does not 
apply here. 
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At one point while reading his apology to the court, Mwale collapsed in the witness box. 
Several factors suggest that the Supreme Court punished Mwale unfairly. To begin, Mwale 
apologized “unreservedly” and quickly admitted to the charge without wasting the court’s time. 
And the court noted that he showed contrition.18 In his letter of apology, he presented himself 
as “very remorseful” and claimed that he wrote the first letter “in a state of emotional trauma 
arising from the demolition of my retirement house as a senior citizen.” He further described 
his first letter as “venting [his] anger”, “careless words”, “unbridled”, “illogical”, and 
“contradictory”. He invited the court to see the sentiments he expressed in the first letter as 
“the rantings of a confused man!” 
 
Moreover, the proceedings apparently made Mwale sick. As indicated in the sick report 
produced in court,19 Mwale’s blood pressure shot up, he had to be rushed to hospital, he 
collapsed in the witness box, and he missed trial on four occasions because of his condition. 
Importantly, Mwale asked the Supreme Court for mercy. In his apology letter, he wrote:20 
 
I throw myself at the mercy of the court, just like in Bible times in the Old Testament 
when a person error [sic] they would run to the same Temple of God where laws were 
interpreted and get hold of the Altar horns as last resort for mercy! In similar fashion 
your lordship, I run to your court as the highest Institution of Justice in our land and 
ask for mercy! 
 
The Court did not grant mercy; it remained unforgiving. It took the fact that Mwale served as 
a Christian reverend to make an example of him. It reasoned that, because a reverend is 
supposed to act and talk in an exemplary manner, his punishment had to be exemplary as well.21 
 
The court’s reasoning raises more questions about the fairness of Mwale’s punishment. For it 
to make an example of a convicted individual, the court must visit him with a sentence “harsher 
than the sanction that this sort of offence normally attracts.” This suggests that Mwale’s 
‘exemplary’ punishment did not fit the crime. Furthermore, for the exemplary punishment to 
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send a message to would-be contemnors, the severe punishment had to treat Mwale as an 
instrument to achieve greater goals. At that moment, the punishment treats Mwale as an 
instrument used and sacrificed to serve the purposes of deterring future offenders. This 
utilitarian approach to punishment runs against some fundamental sense of justice. As 
explained by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice,22 a just legal system does not trade a 
person’s rights for the greater happiness of a greater number of people. 
 
Conclusion 
The Mwale v Mtonga dispute brings up a number of themes: perceptions of corruption in the 
courts, unjustified public attacks against the judiciary, constraints on judges’ ability to respond 
to those attacks, the airing of corruption allegations in the wrong forum, concerns over the 
security of land titles in Africa, and the role of contrition and pleas for mercy in sentencing 
convicted persons. The Supreme Court of Zambia resolved Mwale’s appeal against the High 
Court judgment impeccably, but it miscarried justice in the proceedings it instituted against 
Mwale for scandalizing the court, especially after he remorsefully apologized to the court and 
begged for mercy. 
 
Of the five basic choices open to the court, it chose the harshest. The court could have restrained 
itself. In Mamabolo, the Constitutional Court of South Africa advised courts to refrain from 
quickly inferring that someone’s words or conduct scandalize them.23 To protect freedom of 
expression adequately, the Constitutional Court held that the courts must keep the scope for 
convicting someone for scandalizing the court very narrow.24 Though it does not bind Zambian 
courts, this holding by the South African Constitutional Court could inspire judges in Zambia. 
 
Rather than a thick-skinned court ignoring the contents of a disgruntled and bitter litigant’s 
letter, the judges “agonize[d] long and hard”25 over it. Rather than extend mercy, if not pity, 
the court wished to emphasize how “expensive” “thoughtlessness” can be to their authors.26 
But the court got it wrong when it assumed that, through its punishment, Mwale would bear 
the costs of his misdeed. When one realizes that the court adjourned the trial four times just so 
that it could punish Mwale and send a message to would-be offenders, it becomes clear that 
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the court wasted a lot of resources for what is at the end of the day a trifle. It sat four times, 
adjourned four times, and took hours and other resources to write the judgment. Contrary to 
what the court thought in punishing him, Mwale did not ultimately pay (most of) the cost of 
his scandalizing the court; taxpayers did, as nine judges sat and wasted limited resources to 
deliver a judgment in a trivial matter. 
 
In a fundamental sense, Mwale dropped to the floor to ask for forgiveness, to cope with his 
medical condition, and to mourn the loss of his farm. Though Mwale’s bitterness at losing his 
farm made him act angrily, this does not mean that the court had to take him further down. A 
good judge should expect his or her judgment to make the losing party bitter, but – as argued 
in this commentary on the Mwale matter – a judge should not step on and crush sour grapes 
lying on the floor. 
 
 
 
